This paper discusses the problem of indirect speech acts, as exemplified by "Can you pass the salt?" The paper begins with a brief review of the nature of the problem posed by such expressions. This is followed by a discussion of the role of pragmatics in linguistics, leading up to a discussion of "natural" as opposed to "conventional" inferences. The paper then points out the difference between twio kinds of linguistic convention: conventions "of" the language and conventions "about" the language (which are __Iiroperly considered conventions of the culture that uses the language). A schema is then offered for describing this second, less familiar kind of convention, and an account of "Can you pass the salt?" is given in terms of this kind of convention. The paper ends with a number of examples of various subtypes of conventionalization.
Introduction
In this paper I want to take up the problem of "indirect speech acts", as exemplified by the infamous case, "can you pass the salt?", with the goal of reaching an understanding of its apparently paradoxical nature.
In considering the competing analyses of Gordon and Lakoff (1975) , Sadock (1974) and Searle (1975) , my initial inclination was to reject Searle's discussion as missing the point, in favor of one of the other two.
But I have gradually come around to Searle's position; or perhaps I have only constructed a misinterpretation of it that appeals to me. At any rate, in this paper, I will be attempting an elaboration of my interpretation of Searle's tantalizingly bri...f remarks.
I
will argue for an account of "can you pass the salt" and similar expressions which treats them as conventional but not idioms, by establishing the necessity for distinguishing two kinds of language-related conventions: conventions of language, that jointly give rise to the literal meanings of sentences; and conventions about language, that govern the use of sentences, with their literal meanings, for certain purposes.
I will suggest, in short, that "can you pass the salt", is indeed conventional in some sense, but not an idiom; rather it is conventional to use it (with its literal meaning) for certain purposes. Part of my task will be to dissipate the fog of initial implausibility by establishing on independent grounds the need for this kind of convention about language.
I hope to end up with a framework that gives a reasonable picture of the diachronic transition from indirectly conveyec.i to literal meaning, and allows dr?
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I will also argue, contra Searle, for the notion "conversational postulate", which I have recently argued against in Morgan (1977) .
I will proceed as follows: first I will briefly review the nature of the problem involved in expressions like "can you pass the sa't." This will be followed by a discussion of the role of pragmatics in linguistics, leading up to a discussion of "natural" as opposed to "conventional," then pointing out the difference between two kinds of linguistic convention.
I will then offer a schema for describing the less familar kind of convention, and an account of "can you pass the salt" in terms of this kind of convention.
I will end with a number of examples of various sub-types of conventionalization.
Statement of the Problem
Why are expressions like "can you pass the salt" a problem? Why do I say this expression is apparently paradoxical? The basic fact is this: that one can use a sentence like "can you pass the salt" to convey a request, though it seems at first glance we would not want to consider the literal meaning of the sentence to be that cf a request for the salt. Grice's (1975) notion of "conversational implicature" and accompanying maxims offer a potential explanation for this fact (cf. Gordon and Lakoff (1975) );
but how can we be sure this is the correct analysis? In fact there are two ways to go about giving an account of such cases, and one can construct a case for each that has a certain amount of initial plausibility. The first way, which I will call the "natural" approach, is to argue that even when I make a 3 request in uttering "can you pass the salt," 1. am using the sentence with its literal meaning of a yes-no question; the fact hat I can manage to convey what amounts to a request by asking this xes-no question, is not a matter of my knowledge of English, but a consequence of Grice's maxims, which are, roughly, a set of rules for inferring the intentions behind speech acts, or from the speaker's viewpoint, for selecting one's utterances so as to convey one's intentions, by exploiting the maxims. Given that the need for rice's maxims has been clearly demonstrated anyway, and that we can show how the request nature of "can you pass the salt" is "calculable," that is, it can be derived from Griee'6 maxims, then Occam's razor dictates that we take this as the correct analysis, lacking strong evidence to the contrary.= Further support might be derived from the admittedly vague intuition that it "just feels like" one means it in its literal meaning even when using It to make a request, a point that gales some support from the frequently noted fact that the class of possible responses to "can you..." is just about what one would expect from its literal maanir,g.
Or one can take a conventional approach, saying that "can you pass the salt" is an idiom that wears its history o-its sleeve, as idioms often do, so that what the expression formerly had as impiicature, it now has as literal meaning.
As a consequence, "crn you pass the sale.% now genuinely ambiguous between the literal meaning of a yes-no question and the literal meaning of a request. One can support .s-uch an analysis by observing first that "can you pass the salt" has sum of the grammatical marks of direct requests--the possibility of pre-verbal please, ;-or instance--that not all cases of genuinely indirect requests lave; second that althou51, "can you pass the salt" is indeed calculable, it is not in fact calculated; rather, one gets the point more or less 6rectly, without pny inferential processing, which is Indirect Speech Acts 4 what we would expect if it has become an idiom, thereby part of knowledge of language; third, that "can you pass the salt" is intuitively more direct thin its apparent close paraphrases, like "are you able to " and "is it possible for you to ", which do not have the grammatical properties of direct requests like pre-verbal please, but can, nonetheless, be used to convey indirect requests; fourth, that this kind of conventionalization of indirectly conveyed meaning is in fact clearly attested, which at least increases the plausibility of the idiom approach.
For instance, as Robin Lakoff (1973) has observed, the typical history of euphemisms, expressions the speaker uses to merely hint at what he wants'to avoid mentioning directly, is that they eventually take on as literal meaning the very thing they were originally used to avoid. One can ree a clear example of this in the expression "to go to the bathroom", which obviously originated as a euphemism, having a literal meaning like "to transport oneself to the bathing room", with the conversational implicature that one actually went there with the, purpose of excretion, but at the same time avoiding direct mention of such revolting matters. But now, in at least some American dialects, the implicature has been conventionalized as literal meaning, so that "go to the bathroom" is now an idiom with the meaning "to excrete"; speakers of these dialects thus can say, non-metaphorically, "the dog went to the bathroom on the living room rug". Cole (1975) But before exploring the idea in this quotation, I need to discuss convention and pragmatics a Vt.
Pragmatics and Linguistics
To decide between the "natural" and "conventional" approaches, it is necessary to.make clear what these terms mean.
To do this, I must begin with a general discussion of pragmatics. As far as I know the term was until recently applied to the analysis of expressions like indexicals, whose meaning can only be fully specified relative to context of utterance. 'Recently, though, the term has been extended to cover matters like Grice's "conversational implicature", that are not part of the literal meaning of sentences. As a result, "pragmatics" may be in danger of becoming a useless catch-all term.
But there may be a grain of truth in this lumping together of conversational implicature with the interpretation of indexicals and the like. pronouns should include a recapitulation of the principles we use in determining referents for these terms, then it is clear that it is the same sort of problem, depending on such matters of context as our interpretation of the speaker's goals in the eonverSation, his intention, interests, and so on.
For example, imagine a jar of sugar with a glass lid, on which the word sugar is painted in blue; and imagine that someone puts her fingertips just under the letter uof the word sugar and says "what's that?" Our answer might bes,among other things, "the letter U", the word sugar", "paint", "blue paint", "blue", "English", "a lid", "glass", "a glass lid", "a jar", "sugar", "a jar of sugar", and so on, depending on our interpretation of the person's interests--is she is rational, and knowing that he has seen me vainly trying the door, and that he knows that I know he saw me, then the most Iikely,inferpretation,of his behavior is that he is giving me the right key so that 1 can open tthe door;
'A+
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Notice that in no way is' there any convention involved in this inferential chain, unless one would want to say that there is some cultural convention -dorm "be helpful" involved. At any rate, it is clear that most of the steps in the inference are natural, rather than convention-based.
There is an inference involved, in the interpretation of my use of "thank you," on the other hand, that could be described as involving both convention and natural inference. The inference'l have in mind is the justified inference by the other person that in saying "thank you," I mean to thank him for giving me the key The inference here is in part conventional, in that it is based on knowledge of the English pnrase "thank you," and second on knowledge of "the conventions concerning when one thanks, and for what kind of thing. But it also involves natural inference in his figuring out just what it is I'm thanking him fcr.
As far as communication is concern;p5-then, I use the term "natural" in a way that would be appropriately applied to meaning that is conveyed, or at least can be conveyed, via inferences about intentions behind communicative acts, as in the case of conversational implicature. i.e., its direct translation. Now on the one hand "have you eaten?" is by virtue of its semantics a natural way of greeting someone by conveying concern for his well-being, given the right conditions in the culture, as opposed to "seven is prime" or "your hair is missing"; but at the same time it is entirely arbitrary whether or not a given culture uses "have you eaten?" as a conventional way of greeting. And I think we would not want to say even when it is a conventional greeting that the expression "have you eaten?" means the same as "I greet you.", though indeed that kind of linguistic change does occur now and then. Rather, the convention involved here is a cultural convention about the use of language, not part of the language itself; though that is not to say a good language teacher 4
would not teach it.
Another case: according to Webster (1968) would seem more appropriate to say that there is a convention to the effect that one announces one's presence at the door, etc., by issuing a greeting to the inhabitants. This is not a convention of,the language, but about Its use.
In sum, then, i am proposing that there are at least two distinct kinds-of conventions involved in speech acts: conventions of the language (for example, the meaning of do; the fact that in English the subject of a passive sentence is interpreted as (roughly) patient, and so forth and conventions of the culture about the use of the language in certain cases (for example, the fact that to start an auto race one says "gentlemen, start your engiqes" (and means it), the fact that one is expected to say 
Conventions about Lanouue
As an in' ial approximation, I think conventions about language can be considered to contain three kinds of elements: occasion, purpose, and means.
As the statem3nt ofgmeans tleccm(,s.more and more specific, the con-* vertion approaches a convention of the language, a statement about literal meaning.
As the connections between purpose and means become obscured, the relation between them is ripe for reinterpretation as entirely arbitrary, at which point the convention about the language is re-interpreted as a convention of the language.
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As an illustration, we might consider various hypothetical versions of a convention concerning departure salutations,proceeding from less to more specific versions. As a rather non-specific version, we might start with something like a statement of occasion (which not all conventions will have), and purpose, as in (1).
(
Upon parting, one expresses one's regard for the other person.
Then (1) might be made more specific in a given culture by adding various means specifications, as in (2a) or (2b).
By expressing a concern for the welfare of the other person. May God be with you.
God be with you.
I prey to God that He will watch over you.
I hope God will be good to yo a.
But oae further type of specificity leads to a qualitative change in the convention; namely a specification of means that includes specification of the expression to be used in conforming to the convention, like (5) as a further specification of the parting convention (1) - (2a) -(3b).
By saying the English sentence "God be with you." Notice that in the resulting convention (1) - (2a) - (3b) -(5) the form is specified as a meaningful sentence of Eraiish, recognizable as such; so that in . MOM saying "God be with mpu" as a way of conforming to the parting convention, one is saying it and meaning it in its literal meaning, though sincerity may be little more than pretense. The expression is thus not on a par with an idiom like "Kick the bucket." !n saying something like "John kicked the bucket," meaning he died, the word-by-woAlfeaning of the expression plays no role; in fact one might say that "kicked the oucket" is said (meaning died) in spite of its original ftieral meaning.
But "God be with you" is said, as a way of conforming to the greeting convention, precisely because of its literal meaning; one says it and at least pretends to mean it (an atheist is likely to choose some other expression). Yet it is a matter of convention that one says it (and means it, or at least purports to mean it) under certain circumstances, for certain purposes.
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There is a naturalness to the convention in that there is a natural connective chain between the (most general) purpose (1) 
through failure of language learners to fully reconstruct the occasionexpression chain, might be reinterpreted in the following ways:
Upon parting, one invokes the good will of God toward the other person by saying the English sentence "God be with you."
Upon parting, one expresses one's regard for the other person by saying the English sentence "God be with you."
Upon parting, one says the ,English sentence "God be with you."
The most arbitrary version, of course, is (8), where the convention between occasion and expression is stated directly, not via a purposemeans chain. In such cases, the meaning of the literal expression no longer plays a direct role in the convention; speakers may be aware that the express.ion has a certain literal meaning, but may be entirely unaware what that meaning has to do with parting.
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The use of the expression "break a leg" to wish a performer good luck before a performance is an especially interesting case of a convention about language that seems headed for eventual status of convention of language.
that this expression originated due to the superstition that it would be bad luck to wish someone good luck--therefore one. wished a fellow actor good luck by wishing him bad luck, i.e., a broken leg. But by now the choices of expression is rigidly fixed as part of the convention;
none of the plausible paraphrases below will do for the same purpose.
3)
Fracture a tibla (10) Break your leg It is likely that newcomers to the theater sub-culture will not be aware of the history of the expression, so that the connection between purpose and means will be direct and arbitrary: before a performance, to wish a performer good luck in his performance, say "break a leg." But the expression is not thereby an idiom; if it were we would expect to find it used as if it were an idiom whose literal meaning was "have good luck,"
as in (12) as a way of say;ig (13) . But the expression cannot be used this way.
John really broke a leg last night.
John really had good luck/did well in his performance last night.
The schema I have argued for seems to fit nicely in this case: an occasion, a purpose and a means, the means specified as the utterance of a parOcular expression. But the original natural connection between purpose and means has now been lost.
Given this view of conventions about language, the language learner's .
task is to discover or reconstruct the details of the connection between occasion and purpose on the one hand, and linguistic meansthe sentence used--on the other. In the case of the literal, non-formulaic use of language, the connection is mediated in a natural way, with the literal meaning of the sentence as one of the links in the connecting chain, as in some of the patieg conventions discussed earlier.
But these cone -ctIons, where they are not trivial (e.g., saying "it's raining" to convey that it's raining), must be worIv_,d out by the linguage learner, whose only immediate data are inferences in context about the occasion and/or purpose of the utterance, and the expression employed. It may take some time for the language learner tr; fill in all the missing links in the chain. Accordingly,
we might expect to find that children's linguistic competence has typically more of this arbitrary connection than does an adult's. But even in the case of adults there will probably be in ?ersonal variation on some expressions, describabl,-in terms of the number of missing links in the knowledge of use of the expression. For example, we might find that knowledge about Gesundheit is best captured by (14) for some adults, by (15) or (16) When someone sneezes, to express concern for their health, say the German word for health, Gesundheit.
When someone sneezes, to express concern for their health, say Gesundheit.
When someone sneezes, say Gesundheit.
The third version, (16), if indeed it actually occurs,,is of a rare type; the purpose has been entirety lost, so that the speaker knows only the occasion of using the expression, the only pur,Jse for saying it being the purpose of conforming to the convention. It may be that this kind of case is more frequent among children: when such-and-such happens, one is supposed to say so-and-so. t Now given this kind of convention, how can it be extended to cases like "can you pass the salt"? What's needed is a description that says that in using "can you pass the salt" to make'a request, one is using the sentence with its literal meaning, with the intention of conveying a request via Grice's maxims, but that in doing so one is following a convention about language use; the convention being, roughly, to request someone to do sucl, and-such indirectly, say the sentence "can you (do such-and-such)?", with its ilteral sense. Short-circuited Implicature I suspect this will strike some readers as counter-intuitive, in that the "feel" of an implicature is lacking. One can see that a request implicature is calculable via Grice's maki-ms, but the subjective reaction is that the request nature:of the speech act is conveyed without the sort of indirect feeling we attribute to the presence of inference; the literal meaning is in some way latent, rather than the basis for an inference.
I think this intuition is correct,-and that we need a notion of "short- A simple example is the forms used for identifying oneself over the telephone.
It is conventional at least in the Midwestern U.S.
to use expressions like those illustrated in (17) and (18).
- (17) This is Edith Thornton.
Edith Thornton speaking.
On the one hand, in using these expressions one means them literally. But on the other hand, it is purely a matter of convention that one uses these particular forms rather than any of (19) through (22) (18) and (21) is especially interesting as a demonstration of how form-specific such conventions can be.
2,'
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Here is Edith Thornton speaking.
Edith Thornton is speaking.
I am Edith Thornton.
There are many cases that involve implicature, but as a matter of convention, so that the implicature is short-circuited. For example, (23) is commonly used to convey something like (24) . (23) If you've seen one, you've seen them all.
They're all alike, so it's a waste of time to examine them separately.
It is intuitively clear that (24) could be reasoned out as an implicature of (23); but it is now conventional to use (23) to convey (24) . Although one has in mind the literal meaning of (23) in using it to convey (24), the form of the expression is strictly part of the convention. Sentences having precisely the same literal meaning but even slightly different form do not convey (24) with the same immediacy. If one manages to convey (24) by saying (25) or (26), it will be as a fresh implicature, without the short-circuiting that accompanies the conventional form (23).
If you've seen one; you've seen all of them.
You've seen them all if you've seen one.
Below are some more cases of conventionalised implicature, where a certain expression, with its literal meaning is used more or less conventionally to convey a certain implicature: Tell me how many times I've told you...) (29) it takes une to know one. 
... no questions asked. 
I'd rather be in Philadelphia.
The hearer will recognize that these are famous lines, will conclude reasonably that the speaker must have known he will make the historical connection but did nothing to stop him from making it, therefore must have intended it to be made, and so on. The allusion, and resulting implicature, are conveyed in the usual Gricean fashion. Are you crazy? (38) Have you lost your mind?
Are you out of your gourd?
Indirect Speech Acts 29 and so on. Most Americans have two or three stock expressions usable as answers to obvious questions, as in (40) Is the Pope Catholic?
Do bagels wear bikini:?
But for some speakers the convention does not specify a particular expression, and new ones are manufactured as they are needed. It seems that here a schema for implicature $12s been conventionalized: answer an obvious yes-no question by replying with another question whose answer is very obvious and the same as the answer you intend to convey.
In a similar way, most speakers have a small number of expressions usable as replies to assertions, with the implicature that the assertion is transparently false; (42), for example. 
